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Abstract 
This study contrasts the current role of customs at the EU’s external borders with the role it was 
intended to perform according to international standards in border management. There is a 
considerable imbalance between the involvement of customs and border guards, which impedes 
the smooth operation of border control and poses security risks for the Union and its citizens, 
including terrorist attacks. This paper analyses the causes of this imbalance and proposes 
appropriate solutions that are in line with international standards. 
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EU’s external border 
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1.  Introduction: A long-term companion in border matters, suddenly 
superfluous? 
Customs authorities have a longstanding though mostly low-key reputation in border matters: 
while border guards and police are normally in the limelight when it comes to channelling 
migratory flows and catching dangerous terrorists, customs officers are seen as inconspicuous 
tax collectors; at best spoilsports for tourists returning from holidays with cheap cigarettes and 
expensive Rolex watches. 
But this unspectacular existence has been marked by bright intermissions, when from time to 
time trade flows and revenues have surfaced from oblivion and overshadowed the glory of 
police/border guard colleagues. One of these more glorious periods dates back more than two 
millennia and today still fills customs officers with pride that their profession was among the 
most frequently cited in the Christian Bible – notwithstanding the fact that ancient colleagues 
(such as the tax collector Matthew) were likened to extortionists and other sinners because of 
their materialistic attitude.  
On a more political note, customs skills and strategies promoted progress at decisive moments 
in history, such as the transition from medieval to more productive mercantilist societies in the 
17
th century. They did so again in the 20
th century for European integration, when the new 
customs union completed in 1968 represented the first flagship achievement of the young EU. 
Ever since customs have proved to be a loyal guardian of the Union’s trade and economic 
interests, first, by collecting a sizeable share of its revenues in the form of import duties; second 
by applying quotas, contingents and other quantitative restrictions; and third by enforcing a 
rapidly increasing number of protective measures directed against threats. Such threats range 
from intellectual property rights (IPR) piracy, to illegal drugs, weapons of mass destruction and 
terrorism, and have gained growing importance in the day-to-day operations of customs since 
2001. 
It took many observers by surprise, but following the most recent incident of terrorist threats – 
the Yemen air freight bomb plot
1 of October 2010 – the tide seemed to be turning. Instead of 
calling for reinforced means to beef up customs and its counter-terrorist defences in the 
admittedly neglected air freight sector, politicians invoked a complete paradigm shift by 
                                                      
* Peter Hobbing is a former official of the European Commission, (Justice & Home Affairs), and is an  
Associate Fellow of CEPS. 
1 A bomb hidden in a printer cartridge – probably by al-Qaeda – and destined for a Jewish institution in 
the US was detected in the UK after it had transited the German airport of Cologne. Detection in the UK 
occurred after a tip-off by a former al-Qaeda member rather than through systematic checks by the border 
authorities. For details see BBC, “Q&A: Air freight bomb plot”, BBC.co.uk, 2 November 2010 
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/11658452). 2 | PETER HOBBING 
 
planning to transfer the relevant competences to police. These claims were not just individual 
statements but almost resembled a concerted action – all the more so when considering the 
programmatic background at EU level: the term ‘customs’ had literally disappeared from recent 
policy considerations in the areas of security and even integrated border management (IBM) as 
undertaken by the Stockholm Programme of 2009 and the Internal Security Strategy of 2010.  
What had gone wrong? This question appears all the more legitimate as ‘doing away with 
customs’ would not have corresponded with the mainstream approach in international security 
matters. On the contrary, highly security-conscious countries, such as the US, Australia, Canada 
and even the UK, had indeed streamlined their border services but by no means at the expense 
of customs. In all these cases, customs became an equitable partner (e.g. the US Bureau of 
Customs and Border Protection, CBP) or even the backbone of a new agency (e.g. Australia, 
where customs exercises immigration and other person-related functions on behalf of the 
relevant services). 
If we assume at this stage that the current neglect of the customs aspect represents a specific EU 
phenomenon, we must still acknowledge that there are two diverse approaches in parallel: 
besides the above ‘internal’ Schengen mode, we find an entirely different EU concept being 
taught to external partners in the eastern neighbourhood, the Balkans and Central Asia. If in the 
end it turns out to be a problem unique to the EU, then there would be some probability that this 
is rooted in the peculiar development the EU has experienced in the context of the post-
Maastricht schism between security and mainstream policy areas. To what extent this first-third 
pillar split-up
2 continues to influence the discussion is still an open question.
3 
But whatever the origin, the problem as such is serious and should be tackled soon. Things have 
barely calmed down with the Yemen plot when another, possibly more serious affair looms with 
the ‘dirty bomb’, suspected since February 2011, in a cargo container on the docks of the Italian 
port of Naples.
4 
The study will thus undertake to illustrate the specific assets of the customs approach: always 
goods-related but extremely versatile in their policy approach, the customs services have been 
loyal servants to rulers throughout history in implementing strategies of economic expansion, 
free-trade or protectionist concepts as well as security/safety mechanisms of all kinds. The first 
50 years of European integration, as covered in section 2, have witnessed such versatility in 
particularly short intervals – and yet customs sees itself expelled from the joint management 
responsibility at the end of this period. Section 3 thoroughly reconsiders/revalues the customs 
approach in light of current and future needs while section 4 identifies options for allocating 
customs their rightful place in the European border management architecture. 
2. European  integration:  The Customs Union and beyond 
Following a few unsuccessful attempts before WWII, notably Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi’s 
Pan-European Movement,
5 European integration started in the 1950s as a peace project 
                                                      
2 Regarding the risk that third pillar structures will not only survive but also even ‘contaminate’ former 
first pillar areas such as border management, see Guild and Carrera (2011), p. 3. 
3 A very valuable contribution shedding light upon the current state of customs–border guard cooperation 
is a Center for the Study of Democracy study commissioned by DG HOME. The text was finalised in 
November 2010, but has not yet been officially published. See CSD (2010) and section 5.2.1 of this 
report. 
4 For details, see FLNS, 18 February 2011 (http://www.ifw-net.com/freightpubs/ifw/index/dirty-bomb-
fears-over-radioactive-container-at-italian-port/20017850492.htm). 
5 See “History of Europe: Ever closer Union”, in Encyclopaedia Britannica 
(http://www.britannica.com/bps/search?query=coudenhove); see also Christiansen (1978), p. 23. CUSTOMS COOPERATION IN THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE | 3 
 
conducted by means of economic integration. The merger of customs territories in the sense of 
i) abolishing customs duties among the members and ii) creating a common tariff and a joint 
external border to the outside represented the centrepiece of the operation. The customs union
6 
completed in 1968 has ever since been regarded as a vital ‘foundation’ of the EU.
7 Further 
development phases (1969–75 and 1976–2000) saw the continuous growth of the customs union 
in size and depth, but also implied a definite shift from a mere revenue provider to a 
simultaneously security-conscious organisation – with this last element gaining further 
momentum in the aftermath of the terrorist events of 9/11.
8 
2.1  Beyond the Customs Union: New horizons in the security sector 
In the 1970s, another important turn in customs history occurred. While in the past customs 
administrations generally derived their right to exist from the revenue contributions they 
rendered to the budget, this function gradually diminished. Not only did the worldwide tariff 
reductions agreed under the GATT lead to a generally reduced income from customs duties, but 
also the EU granted a ‘collection fee’ of 10% (later 25%) to member states as compensation for 
their collection costs and at the same time as an incentive to perform this task in a painstaking 
way.
9 In line with international tendencies, the share of customs revenues within the overall EU 
budget thus fell from 22.8% to 9.8% during the period from 1988 to 2005.
10 
Yet this loss was largely compensated by a simultaneous trend towards higher security needs 
and awareness within modern society, which gave customs a new raison d’être. In addition to its 
traditional security functions, such as the fight against illicit drugs, illegal arms and explosives, 
a number of newly emerging risks have led to a whole set of import prohibitions and 
restrictions. Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora on the basis of the CITES Convention 
of 1975, counterfeit/pirated goods in line with the GATT Uruguay Round, and chemical 
precursors destined for illicit drugs manufacture (1988 UN Anti-Drugs Convention) represent 
just a few examples of border-related measures operated by customs. Only on a few spectacular 
occasions has this new security role become visible to the wider public, e.g. when the UK’s 
customs managed to stop the delivery of Saddam Hussein’s Babylon supergun in 1990,
11 just 
before the beginning of the first Gulf War.  
This security trend was reinforced in the new millennium when the analysis of the 9/11 events 
showed that terrorist threats would not necessarily materialise in the form of travelling terrorists 
but could also emerge in the form of bombs hidden in a cargo container.  
The new awareness triggered a series of security programmes (almost exclusively developed in 
the US) meant to tackle the cargo risks. Mechanisms such as the US Container Security 
Initiative (CSI), the Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT) and the Secure 
Freight Initiative soon spread out all over the world, first as external antennas of US homeland 
security and later as part of global networks and specific European developments. 
                                                      
6 The legal basis is mainly the EEC Treaty concluded on 25 March 1957. 
7 See, for example, the Council conclusions on the further development of the EU’s Customs Union of 14 
May 2008 (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/100339.pdf). 
8 With some similarities to the Schengen process between 1985 and the 1990s, see Bigo (1996). 
9 Art. 2(3) of Council Decision of 29 September 2000 (2000/597/EC). 
10 European Parliament (2007), p. 22. 
11 Probably “the largest gun in the world” with a range of almost 1,000 km. See BBC.co.uk, “1990: 
Customs seize ‘supergun’” (http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/april/11/newsid_2477000/ 
2477023.stm). The seizure occurred in the context of responsibilities conferred to customs under the 
legislation on weapons of mass destruction. 4 | PETER HOBBING 
 
2.1.1  US models in cargo security 
As a first reaction in the freight sector, the Container Security Initiative (CSI) came into being 
in early 2002. Given that 90% of the world's trade is transported in cargo containers, the US 
Department of Homeland Security decided to “extend the zone of security outward so that 
American borders are the last line of defence, not the first”.
12 By now, 58 major ports 
worldwide (25 of which are within the EU)
13 allow US CBP officers to screen, by x-ray 
detectors, US-bound containers in concert with the host administration. The CSI mechanism 
also contains the requirement of an advanced cargo notification (the so-called ‘24-hour rule’). 
After initial hesitation, the EU formally approved
14 the arrangements in view of various 
concessions made by the US concerning i) equal treatment of European ports to become part of 
the CSI programme and ii) the option for member states to equally deploy inspectors in US 
ports.
15 
In 2007, the US undertook to improve container security from yet another angle: in line with the 
Secure Freight Initiative, the US CBP was required to fulfil a 100% scanning mandate for 
nuclear and radioactive materials on certain sensitive trade routes (initially three ports, including 
Southampton (UK), with further ports to follow). But in view of the enormous investments 
necessary and the operational costs expected in the ports concerned, the EU vehemently 
protested against the project, pointing out that the burden on society would by no means be 
compensated by reasonable security gains.
16 Similar objections came from other governments 
(e.g. Singapore) and even US authorities,
17 such that the US has already stepped back from the 
overly ambitious 100% rule.
18 
Finally, the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)
19 initiative is considered 
the mother of all supply chain security programmes. Launched in November 2001 with just 
seven companies, the C-TPAT mechanism and its now more than 10,000 members worldwide 
has not just left an imprint on all US-oriented trade, but also served as a general model for 
security standards in international commerce. Although based on voluntary participation, C-
TPAT provides numerous incentives for traders to register in the programme, in particular the 
facilitation of otherwise lengthy import procedures in the US: C-TPAT members benefit from a 
reduced number of inspections and reduced waiting times at the border. These benefits, 
however, have a price in the form of thorough security checks that address potential risks at the 
company level (e.g. personnel, physical/procedural security and access controls) as well as an 
agreement to be signed with the CBP formally committing members to the programme’s 
security guidelines.
20 
                                                      
12 DHS Secretary Tom Ridge, speech of 12 June 2003 
(http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/speech_0118.shtm). 
13 For a complete list of ports, see the CBP website 
(http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargo_security/csi/ports_in_csi.xml). 
14 See EU–US Agreement on cooperation on container security of 13 April 2004. 
15 US CBP, “CSI in Brief”, 20 March 2008 
(http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargo_security/csi/csi_in_brief.xml). 
16 European Commission (2010a). 
17 US CBP (2008). 
18 BTS, “Post-9/11 Maritime Initiatives” 
(http://www.bts.gov/publications/americas_container_ports/2011/html/spotlight_02.html). 
19 US CBP (2004). 
20 Ibid., p. 13. CUSTOMS COOPERATION IN THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE | 5 
 
2.1.2  Approach of the World Customs Organisation in supply chain 
management 
Inspired by the above US concepts, the World Customs Organisation (WCO) undertook to adapt 
its basic features for use at the global level. Notably through its SAFE Framework of Standards 
to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade adopted in 2005, the WCO managed to engage 166 
member administrations representing 99% of global trade to subscribe to the same set of rules, 
which would enhance supply chain security at reasonable costs and give due respect to 
facilitation interests. Based on a two-pillar approach (customs to customs and customs to 
business), the WCO stipulates four core elements for translating the principles into day-to-day 
reality. These are i) harmonising electronic cargo advance information requirements; ii) 
employing a consistent risk-management approach to addressing security threats; iii) 
performing, upon request, an outbound inspection of high-risk containers/cargo; and iv) 
granting benefits to businesses that meet the required security standards (Authorized Economic 
Operator (AEO) issue).
21 
It is the merit of the WCO initiative that it succeeded in promoting the worldwide dissemination 
of its security approach;
22 only when there is a common understanding of the supply chain 
concept, will governments and the business community be willing to make the necessary 
investments.
23 Remarkably enough WCO goes beyond the unilateral vision adopted by C-
TPAT: while the latter exclusively focuses on trade flows to the US (just imports!), the WCO 
mechanism covers all security-relevant operations (import, export and transit). 
2.1.3  The EU safety and security amendment of 2005 
Beyond its initial support for the above US security initiatives, the EU soon reflected on its own 
system. It thereby opted for the WCO model, owing to its wider and more flexible approach, 
which was neither confined to import operations nor primarily focused on customs-business 
relations. 
The security amendment to the Customs Code
24 definitely mirrors the four core elements of the 
WCO SAFE Framework when it introduces the following “major changes to the Code”;
25 i.e. i) 
information requirements for traders prior to import/export, ii) facilitation measures for reliable 
traders/AEOs, and iii) EU-wide uniformity of risk-selection criteria for controls, and iv) 
outbound border inspections upon request (Arts. 182a CCC, 87 and 186 MCC). 
The EU arrangement also resorts to the WCO model as regards the two-fold customs-to- 
customs (risk management) and customs-to-business (pre-shipping notification, AEO) 
approaches.  
The Modernised Customs Code (MCC)
26 as adopted in 2008, together with the e-Customs 
Decision,
27 further refines these concepts, eliminating remaining obstacles of a bureaucratic 
nature and shaping the EU supply chain mechanism as a handy tool which may be managed 
                                                      
21 WCO (2007), pp. 7ff. 
22 By July 2009, 156 out of 174 WCO members had committed to implement the SAFE framework 
(Ireland, 2009, p. 7). 
23 Lane (2004), p. 17. 
24 Regulation (EC) No. 648/2005. 
25 European Commission (2011a). 
26 Regulation (EC) No. 450/2008. 
27 Decision No. 70/2008/EC. 6 | PETER HOBBING 
 
with greater precision from the central level, especially as regards the supervision of national 
practices in security controls/risk management.  
While all these changes may have been motivated by facilitation arguments in favour of EU 
business, the reform also serves the purpose of greater coherence of the customs union and its 
visibility at national level. In view of the benefits of greater competitiveness in the EU 
economic area, member states even renounced certain national procedures (e.g. simplifications) 
that had been dear to traders but hard to manage at the EU level given their many variations. 
This development illustrates an important change taking place in today’s EU: while it is out of 
the question to formally challenge national autonomy in the organisation of administrative 
structures and implementation of legislation, practical constraints such as the manageability of 
the trade system can bring about pragmatic solutions beyond all orthodox doctrines. EU 
customs have elevated this pragmatism to a sort of political creed, allowing them to tackle the 
challenges of the 21
st century: the Customs 2013 programme thus promotes a “pan-European 
electronic customs environment” to ensure that “national customs administrations operate as 
efficiently and effectively…as would one single administration”.
28 
2.2  Customs involvement in the ‘third pillar’: End of a sidetrack? 
European customs cooperation has actually a much longer history than that of the police; while 
the latter only started in 1972 within the TREVI framework, customs authorities already 
encountered the need for efficient administrative contacts during the preparatory phase of the 
customs union (1957–68). In line with longstanding traditions, this cooperation initially took 
place by intergovernmental means. To formalise relations in time for the actual start-up of the 
new customs border, member states concluded the Naples Convention of 1967,
29 entering into 
force in 1970. For more than a decade, the Naples Convention with the Mutual Assistance 
Group (MAG) as its (informal) management committee took care not only of administrative 
assistance regarding the correct application of Community customs law, but also the prevention, 
investigation and repression of customs infringements.  
As we know from internal records of the member state authorities involved, the workload of 
individual fraud and smuggling cases soon exceeded the national capacities available,
30 so that 
the MAG presidency turned to the Commission for help. As an organisational curiosity, from 
1983 to 1992 the MAG operated under a member state presidency with the secretariat provided 
by the Commission (DG XXI Customs), and the Commission bearing all the costs incurred by 
meetings of the MAG and its sub-groups (including travel for member state delegates). Later the 
new Regulation (EC) No. 1468/81 on mutual administrative assistance took over much of the 
MAG’s previous assignments, reducing the latter to cooperation on non-communitarised matters 
(national customs provisions and criminal justice aspects of infringements). 
MAG proved to be quite productive, notably by drafting a series of policy documents and 
practical guidelines, organising operations against drug smuggling by air (‘airline transit 
exercises’ 1987 - 1992) and preparing the later Customs Information System (CIS). The positive 
record of the MAG undoubtedly had to do with the synergy developed through the dual role of 
DG XXI’s antifraud service ensuring the operation of both MAG and the Committee under 
Regulation 1468/81, including the development of the IT systems SCENT and CIS. 
                                                      
28 Art. 5(f), Rec (2) of Decision No. 624/2007/EC. 
29 Convention on mutual assistance between customs administrations, concluded in Naples on 7 
September 1967. 
30 See the Note by the German Finance Ministry (BMF) of 12 February 1979, that MAG, “due to its 
widespread commitments was hardly able to concentrate on current smuggling tendencies”. CUSTOMS COOPERATION IN THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE | 7 
 
Nevertheless, a number of important inconveniences in the intergovernmental set-up soon 
became apparent. Besides the lack of permanent infrastructure and the changing dynamics of 
the various MAG presidencies, the Convention suffered from the fact that all obligations were 
subject to the condition of reciprocity: no measure of assistance could be requested unless the 
requesting party was in a position to provide the same measure in the opposite case (Art. 21).  
Customs cooperation underwent considerable change in the post-1992 era: on the one side, the 
general transfer of JHA matters from the intergovernmental sphere to the EU third pillar meant 
a general revaluation of all areas concerned. The wider umbrella of the Union offered several 
advantages plausible even to eurosceptic member states, notably the close link between certain 
free-movement/Single Market competences of the Community and key JHA areas, and the 
political weight Commission and Parliament had gained over the years.
31 Customs took 
advantage of this situation, as well as the improved infrastructure that the Council General 
Secretariat could offer. The final adoption of the CIS Convention in July 1995, and that of the 
Naples II Convention in December 1997, were among the most tangible results, both offering 
decisive progress in facing the requirements of prosecuting/punishing customs fraud within the 
Single Market. On the other side, customs administrations remained excluded from major 
achievements of the third pillar such as the access to the European Police College (CEPOL), 
still today reserved to police staff. 
Customs cooperation appeared generally isolated in the new Council structure: be it under the 
K.4 Coordinating Committee (Maastricht Treaty, 1993–99) or under the Article 36 Committee 
(CATS) (Amsterdam Treaty, 1999–2009), the customs forum represented an exotic element 
among all the police/counter-terrorism/organised crime groups in its immediate neighbourhood. 
As one can see from Figures 1 and 2, customs was one of five groups under the K.4 Steering 
Group II of the post-1993 situation and one of nine working parties within the Police and 
Customs Cooperation hierarchy under CATS after 1999.  
Figure 1. Council structure 1993 
  
Source: Author’s compilation based on contemporary Council organigrammes. 
                                                      
31 Monar (1994), p. 69f. 8 | PETER HOBBING 
 
Figure 2. Council structure 1999 
 
Source: Author’s compilation based on contemporary Council organigrammes. 
 
Customs matters – despite the productivity of the Customs Cooperation Working Party (CCWP) 
– rarely made it to the Council of Ministers and if they did, ministers hardly took note of them.
32 
This is no surprise, given that home ministers rather look at police as their ‘constituency’ while 
ministers of finance are far away in other Council configurations. 
This unfortunate situation was complemented by a no less peculiar structure at the Commission 
level. During the 1999 restructuring of Commission services, it was deemed appropriate to pool 
all third pillar competences under the new DG Justice & Home Affairs (DG JAI, later Justice, 
Liberty and Security).
33 The transfer of Article 29 TEU functions and corresponding staff to DG 
JAI may have been facilitated by the fact that preventive/investigative functions under 
Regulation (EC) No. 1468/81 (later No. 515/97) had already been ceded from DG TAXUD to 
the predecessor of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF).  
Still, the scattering of customs functions among three services proved to be problematic. While 
the dividing line between TAXUD and OLAF (policy vs. operational matters) was easily 
comprehensible, the new ‘customs cell’ within DG JAI remained isolated within the law 
enforcement and security environment. This isolation was reinforced when the initial host of the 
customs cell (Police and Customs Cooperation Unit), became redeployed to ‘Organised Crime’, 
and later the ‘Fight against Terrorism’. From a substance point of view, it is noted that the third 
pillar customs cooperation – which intrinsically represents “police cooperation between customs 
authorities”
34 – only has the infringement element in common with the JHA security 
environment, whereas all the other case specifics stem from a normal day-to-day customs 
                                                      
32 Interview with Council SG on 19 January 2011. 
33 Decision taken in September 1999. 
34 Grave (2010), p. 104. CUSTOMS COOPERATION IN THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE | 9 
 
terrain.
35 The split-up of customs tasks has thus been seen critically from the very beginning as 
an “artificial and outdated…dividing line”.
36  
Even the Commission recognised in its 2004 Communication on Enhancing Police and Customs 
Cooperation in the EU
37 that “[u]nlike in the case of police co-operation, there is an important 
first-pillar element in customs co-operation”. But so far nothing has changed. 
In early 2011, more than a year after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Council 
CCWP quite demonstratively continued to work in traditional third pillar fashion, i.e. without 
taking note of the new involvement of the EP in security matters, and in strict seclusion from 
the regulatory customs for a.
38 It operates with approximately 10-12 meetings per year, planning 
inter alia joint operations with FRONTEX.
39 While the future of central JHA fora like CATS is 
still uncertain, CCWP is not on the list of Council bodies whose ‘necessity’ is to be re-evaluated 
by COREPER before 1 January 2012.
40 
Although member state representatives on the CCWP (mainly from national customs 
investigation services) seem to appreciate the independence of mainstream customs policy, they 
remain sceptical towards the wider context. Just as before with K.4 and CATS, they now feel 
marginalised in the new Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security 
(COSI),
41 which has been set up to facilitate and monitor operational cooperation in EU internal 
security.  
And when the question comes up of identifying a body that could assume the coordination of 
national customs services as a counterpart to FRONTEX, CCWP appears to be a serious choice 
for some.
42 We return to this issue later. 
3.  Customs and its current status: an assessment of capacities 
As we have seen, customs as trade control and facilitation specialists have gone through a 
number of challenges since the early days of the customs union, whereby they could prove their 
versatility and ability to adjust to new horizons repeatedly. Abolishing internal frontiers to build 
up a larger territory with a new common borderline, reconciling the objectives of fraud control 
with those of trade enhancement and switching from collecting revenues to enforcing complex 
prohibitions and restrictions appears an impressive list of achievements. These achievements 
offer some guarantees that such a versatile administration will also be a dynamic and valuable 
partner to those who look at the external border from a movement-of-persons point of view. 
3.1 The  assets 
Besides achievements already recognised, a number of lesser-known accomplishments might 
still be added to the record. For example, under the keyword ‘versatility’ one might end up with 
                                                      
35 This close link was emphasised even by CCWP in its “Draft strategy for customs cooperation in the 
Third Pillar”, adopted on 4 November 2009 – see Council of the European Union, Customs Cooperation 
Working Party (2009), p. 2. 
36 Ravillard (1994), p. 221.  
37 European Commission (2004a), p. 31. 
38 As expressed by the programmatic title of its current strategic basis “Strategy for customs cooperation 
in the Third Pillar”, Council of the European Union (2009). 
39 Interview with Council SG on 19 January 2011. 
40 Council of the European Union (2010), p. 9. 
41 Created on 27 November 2009 on the basis of Art. 71 TFEU. 
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an endless enumeration of situations in which trade control expertise helped to counter high-risk 
situations even under political or peacekeeping perspectives. Here we just refer to the UN 
embargo against Serbia and Montenegro in the 1990s, when the centrepiece of the operation, the 
Sanctions Assistance Missions Communications Centre (SAMCOMM) was provided by the 
customs DG of the European Commission.
43 
3.1.1 Operational  field 
Occasionally some doubts emerge as to operational capacities that appear crucial for a 
successful exercise of border control and surveillance tasks. 
However, the physical examination of goods is indeed a standard act that customs is by all 
means entitled to carry out: it is part of the customs controls in the sense of the current
44 as well 
as the future Customs Code.
45 Another question is to what extent the right to conduct such a 
search is actually exercised. Modern customs – in their concern to dispose of scarce resources in 
a responsible and targeted manner – strongly support risk management procedures; as a 
consequence, searches, examinations and so forth are applied according to the risk level 
attributed to the consignment in question. A 100% rate of controls as sometimes advocated by 
border guards with regard to persons is by no means a target for customs administrations.
46 
A further issue concerns the place and time of control: according to external observers, customs 
appears to conduct controls/examinations inland at the end of a transit movement rather than 
stopping it before the actual entry into the territory. Here again it appears to be a question of risk 
assessment, as expressed finally yet importantly by the distinction between safety and security 
concerns. In the case of security, i.e. an immediate threat against persons, customs will 
intervene directly at the border while in purely revenue or safety (e.g. IPR violation) cases, it 
may be acceptable to conduct the control (if any) solely at the destination.
47 
Some misunderstandings also exist regarding any further unexpected powers available to 
customs in at least certain member states: a tool highly appreciated by practitioners is that of 
stop and search without reasonable suspicion, as granted to customs in Germany, within a 
border zone of 30 km (land border) and 50 km (maritime border).
48 This power turned out to be 
a very attractive reason for police forces to seek closer cooperation.
49  
Some customs authorities are experienced in carrying out border guard functions on the basis of 
a “mutual conferral of public authority” as established between German customs and Federal 
Police.
50 The mutual conferral has practical importance in situations in which one of the two 
administrations is not represented, e.g. in small maritime harbours (ports, marinas and piers) 
that control police and customs on the basis of joint risk analysis.
51 
                                                      
43 United Nations Security Council (1996), p. 7. 
44 Regulation (EEC) No. 2913/92. 
45 See Regulation (EC) No. 450/2008, to enter into force by 2013; see also WCO (2007), p. 6. 
46 Interview of 11 February 2011 with Mark Fuchter of UKBA, formerly of UK Customs, on different 
control approaches applied/required in customs and border guard environments. 
47 Interview of 18 January 2011 with Tomas Kucirek and colleagues of DG TAXUD. 
48 See § 10 ZollVG. 
49 Interview of 25 January 2011 with Rick Weijermans, deployed to FRONTEX from the Dutch 
Marechaussee, which exercises border police functions in the Netherlands. 
50 Based on §66-68 Bundespolizeigesetz (Federal Police Act) and §1(3)(b) Zollverwaltungsgesetz 
(Customs Management Act). 
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Another less-known feature is the presence of customs on the blue
52 and green borders,
53 to 
exercise surveillance on the stretches of border between official border-crossing points (BCPs). 
In the old days of the customs union, the coverage of these sections of the borders (internal as 
well as external) was one of the key tasks for discouraging the smuggling of coffee, cigarettes 
and butter. Practically all member states entertained special surveillance forces that were 
uniformed and armed to patrol such borders day and night, i.e. surveillance units (such as the 
Zollgrenzkommissariate in Germany) and a customs coast/river fleet. These services 
disappeared from the internal EU borders only in 1993 when customs controls among the 
member states were definitely abandoned. 
At present, the role of customs seems to have greatly diminished even at the external borders: in 
most cases, it is now border guards/border police who ensure the patrolling and surveillance of 
the border outside BCPs,
54 where they are entitled by special delegation to carry out customs 
controls. In other cases (e.g. Poland), customs participate in joint patrols, with border guards 
taking the lead and ensuring the security and support of customs.
55 Only Finland and Germany 
still entertain fully independent customs patrol/mobile unit services
56 that carry out border 
patrols on their own or as a joint/coordinated measure together with border guards.  
Risk management mechanisms are nowadays considered to be the most valuable tool to target 
scarce staff and equipment resources at the highest security threats, no matter whether this 
concerns persons or goods. Customs, under the lead of the WCO
57 and in the framework of the 
2005 security amendment
58 established a refined system to identify and address high-level 
security risks. It may be seen as a process cycle allowing the system to permanently adapt to a 
changing risk landscape.
59 Embedded within the customs security approach and interlinked with 
other players at the international level (in particular the US),
60 it certainly represents a state-of-
the-art solution in freight-related security matters. 
3.1.2 Political  landscape 
Besides its renowned technical capacities, the call for customs to maintain its current 
involvement in EU border management or even extend it also relies on other qualifications. 
Customs was part of the ‘construction team’ that laid the foundations of the EU in its current 
shape. Beyond this recognition as a pioneer of European integration, customs has been able to 
gain valuable experience in enacting Community policies over more than 40 years after the 
completion of the customs union, and more than 50 years since the Treaty of Rome.  
This close relationship with the economic development of the EU has paid off not just in terms 
of acquaintance with the Community way of developing/implementing law; it has also meant 
adapting to a more civilian way of dealing with the ‘customer’. Over time, the role has changed 
from a sovereign tax collector to that of a partner in trade and business. Starting from the 1980s, 
when for the first time a national customs administration saw its vocation as that of 
                                                      
52 ‘Blue’ refers to water borders, at internal as well as maritime waters. 
53 ‘Green’ refers to inland borders between border-crossing points. 
54 See CSD (2010), p. 67f. 
55 Ibid., p. 373f. 
56 Ibid., p. 67f, 223f, 266f. 
57 See WCO, Risk Management Guide (2003); see also WCO (2008), p. 7. 
58 See section 3.2.3 above. 
59 See European Commission (2004b), Standardised Framework for Risk Management in the Customs 
Administrations of the EU, p. 4.  
60 Art. 4(16) Community Customs Code (CCC). 12 | PETER HOBBING 
 
“enhancement of business”,
61 the facilitation aspect has become a standard element of customs 
policy, as is formally recognised by the new EU Customs Code.
62 And despite all the progress 
made in past years, border guards/border police have nothing equivalent to offer on their side. 
So it is not surprising that critics of the Schengen external border and the way it has been 
managed have turned their eyes to customs in the hope that a customs-influenced form of IBM 
could achieve a more “civilian” format, i.e. be clearly marked by the respect of civil liberties 
and etiquettes.  
This approach partially coincided with the proposal for a new set-up of European border 
services consisting of a first-line inspection carried out by non-enforcement officials – e.g. 
“European civil servants (category – border controls)” whose main competences would be the 
full and uniform application of the Schengen rules on border checks – and secondary 
inspections carried out by enforcement specialists to which travellers would be referred in case 
of suspected irregularity.
63 
A second positive feature frequently attributed to customs is the achievement of genuinely 
European legislation, which is identical for the entire territory not merely on paper but in 
practice, due to a rigid system of compliance control. The absence of such uniformity is greatly 
regretted for the Schengen area, where the compliance target has not been met thanks to the 
lesser efficiency of Schengen evaluation and peer review, and where heterogeneity and 
patchwork structures remain the norm.  
It is exactly this objective of achieving a higher coherence in border protection that motivated 
the Busuttil report
64 in the framework of the current revision of the FRONTEX mandate to 
replace the Joint Support Teams and Rapid Border Intervention Teams as proposed by the 
Commission by an EU system of border guards (EBS) in the sense of a permanent pool. Besides 
practicalities, the advantage of this solution would be the clearer European identity it provides. 
A close relationship between customs and the proposed EBS in the framework of a European 
IBM system could certainly enhance this idea.
65 
With full respect to the well-deserved merits of the European customs administrations, one 
should remain sceptical towards too idealistic an image and alert to possible deficits. 
3.2 Possible  deficits   
With all the merits and achievements accumulated over the years, customs may appear as the 
model EU administration, with full regulatory command over its areas of competence – and an 
ideal partner for border guard organisations to enter into cooperation through integrated or 
coordinated border management. Doubts nonetheless arise in several areas, as discussed below. 
3.2.1  EU customs territory – Diverging area, diverging borderlines 
With EU accession member states automatically become part of the customs union, whilst there 
is no automatism regarding Schengen. Some members did not want to join (the UK and 
                                                      
61 See Hobbing (2005), p. 9. 
62 See Recital (5) of MCC, Regulation (EC) No. 450/2008. 
63 For details on this approach, see Carrera (2010), p. 28. 
64 European Parliament (2010b), p. 53. 
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Ireland), others were not admitted (Bulgaria and Romania),
66 while non-member states such as 
Norway, Iceland and Switzerland only became part of Schengen. As a consequence, there is 
considerable divergence between the two territories and their borderlines. One definitely needs 
to distinguish between a border that is relevant for customs purposes and another for passport 
controls.  
Figures 3 and 4 document the split geography for customs and border guards in terms of border 
location as well as actual border length.
67 For reasons of transparency, the comparison is 
confined to land borders. 
At first sight, the much greater length of the customs border (13,165 kms vs. 7,632 kms, see 
Table 1) may appear striking. But it can be easily explained by the long borders of Bulgaria and 
Romania (which are EU external borders only in terms of customs) and by the fact that while 
Switzerland and Norway are Schengen members they remain outside the customs territory. 
Nevertheless, with respect to security/smuggling risks, the borders between Sweden and 
Norway and those between Switzerland and the neighbouring EU members are less important.  
Figure 3. Overlapping territories  Figure 4. Diverging borderlines 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s compilation.  Source: Author’s compilation. 
                                                      
66 Bulgaria’s and Romania’s full integration into the Schengen area, originally foreseen for March 2011 
has been postponed indefinitely because of remaining problems regarding corruption and organised 
crime. 
67 For a concise overview of the territory situation, see the articles on “Customs territory” 
(http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/common/faq/faq_1178_en.htm#2) and “Schengen” 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area). 
Customs and Schengen territory 
Customs territory 
Schengen territory 
Customs and Schengen border 
Customs only border 
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This limited congruency of borderlines, in which not even 40% of their length is subject to both 
customs  and border guard controls, might point to a limited added value of increased 
cooperation between the services. Given the reduced security importance of some of the 
customs-only borders, however, along with the probability that Bulgaria and Romania’s borders 
will soon represent the Schengen external border, one should see this situation as temporary. 
Most of the real hotspots on the eastern land border are already simultaneously covered by both 
administrations.  
Table 1. The border contrast in kilometres (kms of border length) 
  Schengen  
(land border) 
Customs 
(land border) 
AUSTRIA  35  35 
BELGIUM  0  0 
BULGARIA  0  765 
CYPRUS  0  0 
CZECH REPUBLIC  0  0 
DENMARK  0  0 
ESTONIA  338  338 
FINLAND  1,340  2,076 
FRANCE  0  572 
GERMANY  0  411 
GREECE  1,228  734 
HUNGARY  1,104  656 
ICELAND  0  0 
IRELAND  0  0 
ITALY  0  734 
LATVIA  449  449 
LITHUANIA  950  950 
LUXEMBOURG  0  0 
MALTA  0  0 
NETHERLANDS  0  0 
NORWAY  196  0 
POLAND  1,163  1,163 
PORTUGAL  0  0 
ROMANIA  0  1,876 
SLOVAKIA  98  98 
SLOVENIA  670  670 
SPAIN  20  19 
SWEDEN  0  1619 
SWITZERLAND  41  0 
UNITED KINGDOM  0  0 
Totals  7,632  13,165 
Sources: Author’s compilation, based upon data from FRONTEX V-Aula as well as CIA Worldbook. 
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3.2.2 Uniform  application of the law 
For a traditional Community/first-pillar administration, it would appear normal if the 
application of legislation was aligned to the greatest extent possible. Unfortunately such a 
consideration is not automatically valid for structures like the EU, where centralised legislative 
competences are paired with decentralised competences at the implementation level, as 
stipulated by the conferral principle (Art. 5(2) TEU) in conjunction with the obligation of 
member states to implement legally binding Union acts (Art. 291(5) TFEU).  
The patchwork situation of 27 national infrastructures applying EU law in their own way, as we 
know from the Schengen context, thus also exists in the customs field – at least to a certain 
degree. Of course, there is the formal EU infringement procedure (Art. 258 TFEU, formerly Art. 
226 TEC), but this artillery proves to be too heavy to address daily compliance issues. 
As a consequence, the EU was confronted in 2004 with a US complaint before the World Trade 
Organisation, claiming that its customs union i) failed to administer the uniform application of 
EU customs law by the 25 national administrations, thus infringing Art. X.3(a) GATT 1994, and 
ii) did not promptly review and take corrective administrative action as required by Art X.3(b).
68 
From then on the ‘uniform application’ of customs legislation, in particular the Community 
Customs Code, has become a key phrase for any further development. Already the Modernised 
Customs Code of 2008 installed uniformity of application as a major principle of customs 
operation, as evidenced by its mention in very prominent places, i.e. Recital 5 as well as Art. 
1(1) MCC. In addition, the Customs 2013 Programme requires coherence in the sense that 
“controls are implemented effectively at every point of the Community customs territory”.
69 
And finally the 2013 Action Programme sketched out the overarching aim that “national 
customs administrations should operate as efficiently and effectively and react to any 
requirement arising from a changing customs environment as would one single 
administration”.
70 
In terms of practical solutions, the customs union seems to rely on the e-border mechanisms of 
the new customs code (MCC), i.e. in that individual decisions by national customs may be 
monitored by the central level and thus a certain coherence can be achieved.
71 
3.2.3  The vexed question of penalties 
So far, despite customs legislation being an exclusive EU competence,
72 its enforcement 
represents an exclusive function of the member states.
73 Considerable differences among the 
member states in terms of (administrative and criminal) penalties have been found to lead to 
regrettable distortions of competition in the internal market, which the European Court of 
Justice has consistently qualified as equivalent to illegal quantitative restrictions among the 
member states (Art. 28 TEC, now Art. 34 TFEU).
74 
                                                      
68 Cf. Anaboli (2010), p. 391 and the Rapid Press Release IP/06/1557 of 14 November 2006 
(http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/1557&format=HTML&aged=0&languag
e=en&guiLanguage=en). 
69 European Commission (2005), p. 6. 
70 Decision No. 624/2007/EC, Recital 2. 
71 Arts. 1, 2(1)(b) MCC. 
72 Art. 3(1)(a) TFEU. 
73 See Anaboli (2010), p. 389. 
74 See ECJ decision in Case 41/76, Donckerwolke/Schou of 15.12.1976.  16 | PETER HOBBING 
 
In light of the traditional importance member states attribute to their criminal law as an intrinsic 
part of their national sovereignty and identity, previous harmonisation attempts by the 
Commission in the 1980s and 1990s failed.
75 But with the new approaches in terms of 
compliance and uniform application (see section 4.2.2 above), DG TAXUD is currently making 
another effort to resolve the issue.  
At first sight, the situation appears favourable: under the Lisbon Treaty, the approximation of 
criminal laws is possible in the sense of establishing minimum rules in areas of harmonised 
legislation, such as the Customs Union (Art. 83(2) TFEU). A necessary precondition is that this 
approximation appears “essential to ensure the effective implementation” of the Union policy in 
question. To formally establish the “essential necessity” of the envisaged measure, the 
Commission has commissioned a study on the penalties situation in the member states for which 
the results are expected in 2011.  
Given the uncertain outcome of the study and the disadvantages of approximation (lengthy 
implementation process by means of a directive), another option is being considered. If the 
objective could be reached by means of administrative penalties, the prospects would appear 
much brighter: this approach could envisage full harmonisation of such sanctions, and also take 
advantage of directly applicable legislation. However, some member states make no distinction 
between criminal and administrative penalties which might bring DG TAXUD back to the 
approximation of criminal law as the only applicable solution. 
3.2.4  Less funding for training and equipment  
In the heyday of the Single Market movement of the early 1990s, plenty of resources were 
available to support integration. A retrospective 1998 Commission report stressed that  
it became apparent that administrative cooperation between the Member States needed 
to be strengthened in all the areas in which discrepancies in the implementation of 
Community law might give rise to malfunctions in the management of the internal 
market…[and that] customs was considered a priority sector from the outset.
76 
Following the first pilot project in 1989, the Matthaeus programme was officially launched in 
1991 to provide “common training schemes to ensure that Community law … was applied 
uniformly and to encourage customs officers to become more aware of the Community 
dimension of their duties”
77 (emphasis added). Over the years, a large number of events – 
seminars, staff exchanges and monitoring operations – were held, through which Matthaeus 
obtained practically the same popularity among customs officials as the later Erasmus initiative 
did among university students. Towards the end of the 1990s, Matthaeus was incorporated into 
the Customs 2000 programme, which in turn was absorbed by Customs 2003, Customs 2007 
and now Customs 2013. 
It seems that with this absorption into programmes with a wider remit, the Matthaeus idea had 
lost its raison d’être; the purpose of the common management of the external border seemed 
accomplished and no more specific effort was needed. This was also evidenced by the rather 
limited resources now allocated to customs for these purposes. For the entire period 2007–13, 
Customs 2013 foresees no more than €11.4 million,
78 i.e. less than €2 million per year for 
common training purposes, whereas during Matthaeus times the training budget (apparently) 
                                                      
75 See Anaboli (2010), p. 390. 
76 European Commission (1998), p. 2. 
77 Ibid., p. 3. 
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amounted to 20 million ECU per year.
79 One should also take into account that other items, for 
instance the “security aspects of customs policy” (€38.7 million), also serve to improve the 
coherence of external border management. 
Nevertheless, these budgets by no means match those available for the external border for other 
Schengen aspects: FRONTEX alone spends between €5.8 and €7.2 million per year on border-
related training.
80 In addition, there is the extensive aid granted by the external borders fund as a 
“financial solidarity mechanism to support the states [that] endure, for the benefit of the 
Community, a lasting and heavy financial burden arising from the implementation of common 
standards on control and surveillance of external borders and visa policy”.
81 The sum €1,533 
million is distributed among the states in question on the basis of objective criteria expressing 
the burden of each state for external border control and visa policy.  
3.2.5 Political  support 
Attentive political observers are familiar with the sight: whenever security incidents such as the 
recent Yemen air freight bomb plot occur, it is the minister of the interior or home minister 
responsible for border guards and police who stands up first and informs the media even though 
freight control is primarily a customs matter.
82 Ministers of finance, to whose portfolio customs 
normally belongs, are less eager to address the public in such matters, as they gain their 
reputation from policy fields other than security. It therefore turns out to be a tactical 
disadvantage for customs that ‘their’ minister usually prefers other policy issues, such as budget 
and taxes, through which s/he wants to shine and impress the public. Security is just a secondary 
field in this regard. 
3.2.6  Customs coordination – A currently vacant function 
In a way, the current state of customs and its role on the external border is like a ship without a 
captain. What we see is 27 national administrations present at the border and (loosely 
connected) various bodies at the central level, none of which has full control of what is going on 
on-site. Until the early 1990s, the Commission through its customs service (initially the Service 
de l’Union douanière/Customs Union Service, from 1986 DG XXI and now DG TAXUD) was 
in charge of everything: customs legislation, efforts to combat fraud and Commission assistance 
to customs cooperation in the intergovernmental field (Naples Convention). Obviously, it also 
represented one of the main actors in the completion of the Single Market.  
Since then customs has split into three distinct segments, i.e. i) DG TAXUD in charge of 
general customs legislation; ii) the Anti-Fraud Office OLAF taking care of the administrative 
prevention/investigation of infringements of the customs regulation since 1995; and iii) the 
CCWP, responsible for cooperation regarding the prosecution and punishment of infringements. 
This situation has additionally been burdened by a new Council configuration in place since 
2002, whereby customs legislation has partially been dealt with by trade and industry ministers 
within the Competitiveness Council rather than by finance ministers in ECOFIN.
83 And it 
                                                      
79 See European Commission (1998), p. 15. 
80 FRONTEX (2010), p. 11. 
81 European Commission (2011b). 
82 See e.g. the Reuters news article “Freight stopped from Yemen after bomb scare – Germany”, 
Reuters.com, 31 October 2010 (http://in.reuters.com/article/2010/10/31/idINIndia-52573720101031). 
83 See Council of the European Union (2011), p. 12.  18 | PETER HOBBING 
 
should not be forgotten that the former third pillar CCWP continues to report to ministers of 
justice and home affairs.
84 This is certainly not a coherent solution! 
As a consequence, customs interests have not been pursued in a systematic manner, as before, 
and have been unable to match the dynamic approach displayed by the Schengen side in its 
coherently structured coordination between DG HOME, FRONTEX and the Council hierarchy 
under the JHA ministers. 
So for customs to resume its former role, some important structural changes need to take place 
to allow for a holistic approach, combining customs’ various assets under trade and security 
aspects. We look into this in section 4. 
4.  Integrated vs. coordinated border management: finding the right 
concept/place for customs 
Before 2001, ‘integration’ was an unknown term in inter-service relations on borders still 
widely dominated by jealousy and esprit de corps thinking. The change came with the events of 
9/11 when unity and the ultimate pooling of resources were suddenly in demand to build up 
strong defences against terrorism. Quite naturally, the US was the first to take concrete action: 
by 19 September 2001 all border-related agencies including customs became part of the 
Terrorist Response Task Force
85 before they were merged in March 2003 into the new US CBP 
within the Department of Homeland Security. 
The EU reacted soon afterwards: in December 2001, the Laeken European Council in its famous 
border management conclusion prescribed similar treatment for the border agencies, for which 
the range of solutions considered (“a mechanism or common services to control external 
borders”)
86 even included the option of a US-style merger. Subsequently, however, the 
ambitious beginnings were somewhat watered down when encountering the still unfavourable 
Union reality.  
While the 2002 Commission Communication, Towards Integrated Management,
87 still covered 
all options (e.g. the creation of a European Corps of Border Guards,
88 full participation by 
regulatory administrations such as customs and even plant health and similar services),
89 later 
concepts like the definition by JHA ministers of December 2006 diminished the initial 
optimism. A more modest approach emerged, unilaterally focusing on the movement of persons 
and the involvement of police authorities.
90 Most recent statements, including the Stockholm 
                                                      
84 Ibid. p. 9. 
85 US CBP, “History Time Line” (http://nemo.customs.gov/opa/TimeLine_062409.swf). 
86 European Council (2001), No. 42: “… The European Council asks the Council and the Commission to 
work out arrangements for cooperation between services responsible for external border control and to 
examine the conditions in which a mechanism or common services to control external borders could be 
created.” 
87 See European Commission (2002) and, as regards customs, (2003, p. 39ff). 
88 European Commission (2002), p. 12. 
89 Ibid., pp. 9, 16. 
90 Council of the European Union (2006), p. 26. “Integrated border management is a concept consisting of 
the following dimensions: 
•  Border control (checks and surveillance) as defined in the Schengen Borders Code, including relevant 
risk analysis and crime intelligence 
•  Detection and investigation of cross border crime in coordination with all competent law enforcement 
authorities 
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Programme of 2009
91 and the Internal Security Strategy of 2010,
92 further strengthen the 
impression that integrated border management mainly deals with law enforcement and 
combating crime. 
Although the downsized EU approach may be disappointing and divergent from international 
standards, the self-imposed limitation appears understandable in the EU context with its 
patchwork of 27 members and innumerable services involved in border matters. Even where 
limited to the police/border-guard side, such action may be considered an enormous integrative 
effort and accomplishment.  
And yet, for the purposes of clarity it is indispensable to look closely at the intrinsic elements of 
integrated border management in order to determine which of the various approaches operating 
under this denomination really deserve the label. From an etymological point of view (where 
integrate means “combine or be combined to form a whole”)
93 we do not gain absolute clarity, 
as this definition would apply to mergers as well as firmly structured networks; it would also 
not exclude partial solutions entailing just some of the services competent in border matters. 
Another clue could come, however, from the initial statement that IBM serves the ultimate 
objective of pooling resources in terms of staff, expertise and equipment to make the operation 
of borders more efficient in achieving their intended purposes. 
4.1  Existing IBM models – An evaluation 
In view of the ultimate pooling criterion, a satisfactory evaluation of the various IBM models at 
hand could take place along the lines of who participates, which border activities are affected 
and how the interaction between the services is structured (network or merger). 
4.1.1  The ‘who’ element: Are all relevant services involved? 
As a comparison of Figures 5 and 6 clearly indicates, the international concepts see their border 
purposes met through the most comprehensive inclusion of all services involved in border 
control, no matter whether their involvement is motivated by security or regulatory control. It is 
for this reason that the third column in the figures is just indicative: “other” could equally refer 
to agricultural, veterinary or traffic control authorities, which are actually quite frequently 
implied in one way or another in border controls.
94 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
91 European Council (2009). 
92 Council of the European Union (2010). 
93 See the Concise Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008 
(http://www.wordreference.com/definition/integrate). 
94 For a more comprehensive list including railways, airports, harbour masters and private operators with 
an impact on border control/security, see the “Guidelines for Integrated Border Management in EC 
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Figure 5. The EU IBM concept:  Figure 6. International IBM concepts: 
Administrative branches involved  Administrative branches involved 
 
Source: Author’s compilation.  Source: Author’s compilation. 
 
Another important element is to be found in the bi-dimensional orientation of coordination 
links. Unlike the purely vertical approach of the EU Schengen model  (coordination only 
between FRONTEX/DG HOME and the member state authorities at the national/local levels, 
but not between the Schengen hierarchy and its respective counterparts within customs), the 
international approach incorporates links between the hierarchies at all levels. It should be 
stressed that except for the EU Schengen zone, the wider international approach is preferred 
everywhere else in the world. Even international EU missions, such as EUBAM
95 in Moldova 
and Ukraine, follow the international model, inter alia manifested by the fact that the head of the 
mission is a border guard officer and his deputy a customs official.
96 
Typically such links would be established – as long as there is no formal merger as in the case 
of the US CBP or the UK Border Agency (UKBA) – in the form of interagency working groups 
at the central EU and national levels (e.g. inter-ministerial working groups) with regular 
coordination meetings.
97 At the local level, where the offices of border guards and customs are 
often side-by-side if not in the same building, the appropriate approach could be a jour-fixe 
arrangement, by which the partner services exchange briefings at weekly meetings.
98 
If the EU Schengen model is characterised as a ‘no customs’ approach, it should nevertheless be 
noted that in practice certain horizontal links may exist at the national/local levels, but this is not 
part of the official strategy, at least to the extent that it goes beyond purely security matters.
99  
Horizontal links between border guards and customs can take multiple forms, such as i) 
cooperation procedures at border-crossing points and inland, including joint operations and 
controls; ii) joint training; and iii) the sharing of equipment and joint procurement.
100  
                                                      
95 EUBAM refers to the European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine. 
96 See the EUBAM website (http://www.eubam.org/en/about/structure). 
97 Ibid., p. 64. 
98 Ibid., p. 53. 
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4.1.2  The ‘what’ element: Does the coordination/integration cover all 
relevant subjects, i.e. security and regulatory matters? 
The one-dimensional approach favoured by the EU/Schengen is focused not only on one 
administrative branch (police and border guards) but also to a certain extent on a limited 
subject, i.e. security while neglecting facilitation.  
This situation results from a combination of factors. On the one side, the legal instruments in 
question, i.e. the FRONTEX Regulation of 2004 and the 2006 Council definition of IBM, both 
use a neutral formula in which the scope of action is confined to regulatory action
101 or 
comprises “border control…as defined by the Schengen Borders Code” and the “detection and 
investigation of cross-border crime”.
102 On the other side, the more recent programme papers 
(the Stockholm Programme and the Internal Security Strategy) place IBM under the heading of 
“[a] Europe that protects” in the direct neighbourhood of the Internal Security Strategy, law 
enforcement, criminal justice and the new Council committee on internal security (COSI).
103 
It is no surprise that on the basis of such ambiguous texts, far-reaching misunderstandings arise 
that affect not just on the authorities concerned but also outside bodies engaged in evaluating 
the current state of border cooperation, as can be seen in the study on customs/border guard 
cooperation by the Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD). Such misconceptions may easily 
develop a momentum of their own, e.g. when they are used to explain the inefficiency of 
cooperation by the fact that FRONTEX lacks a partner agency at the EU level representing the 
“law enforcement aspects of MS’ customs”, as if FRONTEX’s vocation as well as that of 
border guard/customs cooperation was primarily seen in this field.
104 
4.1.3  Merger or coordination: ‘How’ should the relationship be 
organised? 
Although practised in just a handful of countries around the world,
105 the option of merging 
border authorities into just one agency has heated up the debate for years and eventually led to a 
change of label for all those solutions that did not include such a merger. Especially in the 
terminology of WCO,
106 such approaches were subsequently called ‘coordinated border 
management’ (CBM) in order to provide for a clear distinction.
107 At the EU level, the term 
‘integrated border management’, introduced for customs purposes by the 2003 Communication 
on the Role of Customs,
108 has been retained up to the present day. Only some member state 
customs administrations seem to prefer the CBM terminology.
109 
                                                                                                                                                           
100 The EU IBM Guidelines contain many additional examples, cf. European Commission (2009). 
101 Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004. 
102 Council of the European Union (2006). 
103 Regarding the Stockholm Programme, see European Council (2009), pp. 36f; regarding the Internal 
Security Strategy, see Council of the European Union (2010), p. 2 and many other places throughout the 
document. 
104 CSD (2010), p. 86. Similar passages are found in other places of the study. 
105 Statement by WCO representative M. Polner at the Workshop “The Future of the EU’s Integrated 
Border Management Strategy”, held at CEPS, Brussels, 29 November 2010. 
106 Interview meeting with WCO panel on 19 January 2011. 
107 WCO (2009), p. 3. 
108 European Commission (2003). 
109 Statements at the CEPS Workshop in Brussels on 29 November 2010 (op. cit.) as well as the interview 
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For a better understanding of the merger and CBM concepts, below we briefly look at some 
major examples. 
The US Bureau of Customs and Border Protection 
The US CBP, with its staff of currently 42,000 officials provides complete border services from 
coast to coast, with the priorities of i) providing protection against terrorism, ii) securing and 
facilitating trade and travel, iii) enforcing immigration rules and iv) enforcing drugs laws as 
well as many other US regulations.
110 In line with these objectives, the CBP has absorbed policy 
and management competences as well as staff from various government departments, including 
the Department of Agriculture, the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (specifically, 
immigration inspectors and the US Border Patrol), and the US Customs Service.
111 
The new mission statement clearly indicates CBP deals with border security and has also 
assumed the regulatory functions of the preceding legacy agencies: it is especially the word 
‘facilitation’ that points to a trade and traveller-friendly tendency. This is equally true for the 
revenue functions of former US Customs, which were transferred with only a few supervisory 
tasks retained by the Treasury Department.
112 The radical departure of Treasury from the 
customs field may appear surprising but was motivated by the sharp decline of customs 
revenues over the years, in contrast to the early years of the US, when customs duties 
represented the main income.
113 
Within the CBP, careers no longer distinguish between goods and person-related staff: any CBP 
officer or border patrol agent is in charge of “enforcing laws related to revenue and trade, 
seizure of contraband, interdiction of agricultural pests and diseases, and admissibility of 
persons”.
114  
In terms of assessment, government and CBP staff seem completely satisfied, especially since 
“already 5 years after the move, none of the younger officials could imagine any situation other 
than the current CBP structure”.
115 
The UK Border Agency  
Formed on 1 April 2008 and operational since August 2009, the UKBA has an overall staff of 
approximately 25,000 officials, partly located abroad to exercise visa vetting and intelligence 
functions. Its backbone is seen in an operational workforce of 9,000 warranted officers 
transferred in equal parts from HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and the Border and 
Immigration Agency (BIA).
116 
Concerning competences, the UKBA has assumed the complete functions of its preceding 
agencies BIA (Border and Immigration Agency) and UK visas as well as the port-of-entry 
functions of HMRC. Unlike the US situation, some important functions in the field of customs 
                                                       
110 See the CBP mission description on the CBP website (http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/about/). 
111 See “US Customs and Border Protection” 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._Customs_and_Border_Protection). 
112 US Congress (2002), Homeland Security Act, sec. 412, p. 2179. 
113 Statement by US Customs Attaché D. Dolan at the CEPS Workshop in Brussels on 29 November 2010 
(op. cit.). 
114 See the CBP Fact Sheet on CBP careers (http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/careers/ 
customs_careers/officer/officer_fact_sheet.ctt/officer_fact_sheet.pdf). 
115 Interview with US Customs Attaché D. Dolan on 12 January 2011. 
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policy thus remained with HMRC, which concerns inter alia the representation of the UK in 
policy fora such as the EU and WCO.
117 
The UKBA Border Control Department (‘Border Force’) is conceived as a uniform service 
structure that makes no distinction between former customs and BIA officers and expects every 
agent to intervene in both passport and goods control and to be flexible enough to implement 
security as well as facilitation strategies. From an evaluation standpoint, reactions seem rather 
positive.
118 Interestingly enough, there has been no assessment from a budgetary perspective; 
according to Deputy Director Mark Fuchtner this is due to the security-motivated creation of the 
UKBA (security has no price). 
If there were any criticism, it might first of all concern the remaining competence gap between 
the UKBA and HMRC. As the latter retains policy functions and international contacts, the 
UKBA complains that it cannot directly negotiate with EU players like DG TAXUD. On the 
other side, according to outside sources harmony is not that perfect within the new agency, 
given that officials receive different pay depending on whether they come from HMRC or BIA. 
Also, former customs staff find it difficult to adapt to BIA-style control strategies, which might 
amount to a 100% control rate, whereas customs is much more used to an approach based on 
risk assessment in border controls.  
The Australian Customs and Border Protection Service 
Australia entertains a single frontline presence as ensured by its customs service (since 2008 
renamed “ACBPS”). Different from the US and UK, this solution is not based on a merger of 
services, but ACBPS exercises certain frontline/primary inspection functions on behalf of and in 
close cooperation with other agencies such as the Federal Police and the Department of 
Immigration. It thus combines vital border controls regarding i) goods and ii) passengers in just 
one hand whereby – depending on the outcome of checks – the case may be referred to police or 
immigration officers.
119  
ACBPS staff thus needs a variety of skills in person as well as goods-related controls: they must 
cover a wide range of tasks from the collection of customs duties to measures of 
counterterrorism.
120  
To ensure coordination with the other agencies, ACBPS holds the chairmanship within the 
Australian Border Management Group.
121 
Germany and other CBM models 
German customs belong in the category of member state administrations expressly sceptical of 
any formal merger solution.
122 This is mainly owing to the consideration that security matters 
(in particular counter-terrorism), which represent the main link in the above merger solutions, 
do not have such prominent importance in the overall policy of their countries. With the 
                                                      
117 Interview with M. Fuchtner (UKBA) on 11 February 2011. 
118 Ibid.  
119 ACBPS (http://www.customs.gov.au/site/page4222.asp); Interview with C. O’Keefe, on 1 February 
2011. 
120 ACBPS (http://www.customs.gov.au/site/page4343.asp). 
121 ACBPS, “Annual Report 2009-2010”,  
(http://www.customs.gov.au/webdata/minisites/annualreport0910/ceoreview.html). 
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respective focus of customs and border guards/police being set differently on trade and travel 
flows, the added value of combining both forces would therefore be minimal, if not 
counterproductive. Such arguments should equally be considered when looking at the option of 
a “super-agency” at the European level in the sense of adding a customs department to 
FRONTEX.
123 
Some of the strongest arguments are drawn from the governmental Werthebach Kommission,
124 
which analysed the possibility of creating a new German security institution. They favoured a 
fusion between federal police forces, but clearly discarded any option affecting customs, 
including that of a “financial police”.
125 
There are already efficient coordination structures with the Bundespolizei (border guards) on 
the basis of multiple administrative arrangements, including cooperation in the field of risk 
management.  
The most striking example of a merger-like but coordination-based cooperation is that of the 
Maritime Security Centre (Maritimes Sicherheitszentrum, MSZ), operational since early 2007. 
Besides customs and federal police, other agencies have also become part of the network, which 
ensures a 24/7 presence along the coastal waters of Germany. The ships remain under the 
respective flags but are marked with a specific German coast guard logo. A new strategy 
involves the exchange of crews and eventually the joint manning of patrol vessels. In the CSD 
study on customs and police cooperation, this solution is considered “best practice”.
126 
4.2  Guidelines and best practices – Motors of change? 
Within the wide range of options available in the field of IBM/CBM we might find some 
guidance within the following publications. 
4.2.1  CSD study on best practices in the cooperation between border 
guards and customs administrations of 2010127  
With its snapshot of current practices, the CSD study has evidenced what a wide variety of 
cooperation forms exist. However, it appears doubtful to what extent the mere awareness of 
such diversity can help the EU to find a more coherent management of its external border. 
Despite remarkable efforts the study was not able to consult more than 12 member states, and 
even there the samples taken were rather selective. Consequently, it is likely that a more 
comprehensive survey would have revealed still other valuable practices, so at this stage it 
would seem rather presumptuous to label the examples cited as “best practices”.  
There are further concerns: the range of possible areas of cooperation appears incomplete, and 
there is too much emphasis on security whilst too little on regulatory/facilitation aspects.
128 
Most of all, the best practice approach appears a questionable choice
129 in view of the 
                                                      
123 See Section 5.3.3 below. 
124 See Werthebach Kommission (2010), pp. 143ff.  
125 Interview meeting with German customs in Bonn on 8 February 2011; see also Spiegel.de, 
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requirement of a uniform application of EU border legislation. If the study recommends 
“political will” to be generated by Commission Communications, public debates and impact 
assessments
130 as motors of change, one tends to think of the soft law experiences of the post-
Maastricht times, when Council resolutions and recommendations did not produce any 
sufficient legislative change. We should not forget that under the Lisbon Treaty border matters 
fall under the regular legislative procedure and could therefore be more appropriately tackled by 
the mainstream tools. 
4.2.2  Commission Guidelines for Integrated Border Management in EC 
External Cooperation of 2009131  
Based on the success of former examples (Western Balkans, Central Asia), the 2009 Guidelines 
embody a modern post-Lisbon style by rejecting any basic separation between regulatory and 
security aspects. They follow current international standards in IBM matters and are in line with 
the open approach of the Laeken generation, especially the 2003 Commission Communication 
on the Role of Customs in the Integrated Management of External Borders.
132 
Technically speaking, the guidelines contain best practice examples, but as illustrations rather 
than a primary aim. The emphasis concerns clear advice on how each agency should construct 
its relations with other authorities of the same administration (intra-agency cooperation, e.g. 
within customs), with other agencies (inter-agency cooperation, e.g. customs–police), agencies 
of another country (international cooperation) or with non-state actors.
133 Specific instructions 
deal with migration matters, data protection and risk analysis.
134 There is an equal balance 
among security, regulatory and pure organisational/facilitation matters and a full recognition of 
each branch according to its competences and functions. 
One might be surprised to learn that these guidelines were conceived for ‘export’, which 
includes future EU member countries such as Croatia, but that they should not apply at home. 
The Commission justifies this situation by the fact that the external guidelines were never 
formally submitted to and approved by the member states. It is obvious that the guidelines stand 
in stark contrast to the IBM definition adopted by the Council in 2006,
135 especially insofar as 
they go beyond the narrow Schengen-confined vision of the latter. 
4.3  Finding the right place for customs in integrated border management 
Having identified the vital elements of a modern, Lisbon-compatible IBM approach, it is now 
important to draw conclusions in view of allocating customs a place from which its expertise 
would have the most beneficial effect on the future of European border management. 
When we look at the current architecture at the European level, the existing vacancy in customs 
matters – in the sense that there is no direct counterpart to FRONTEX – seems partially filled by 
the Council CCWP. In the framework of its regular contacts with the former third-pillar 
Council hierarchy under the Article 36 Committee, FRONTEX has also entertained relations 
with the CCWP in light of its experience in strategic threat assessment and certain customs-led 
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joint operations.
136 Despite continued FRONTEX interest, concrete measures of cooperation 
have not been accomplished: besides concerns of principle by certain member states, it was 
mainly practical/organisational difficulties in terms of the rotating presidency and the lack of 
staff infrastructure which impeded such activities. Yet FRONTEX is counting on implementing 
a first joint operation in the area of cross-border crime/smuggling by the end of 2011.
137 
Of course, examples of satisfactory to excellent border cooperation between customs and border 
guards exist within the member states but they are subject to considerable divergence.
138 A 
variety of approaches represents no solution for the EU, which relies on the uniform application 
of its border laws, no matter whether this concerns the movement of persons
139 or that of 
goods.
140 It would therefore appear indispensable that such compliance with the rules is 
positively coordinated from the central level – but so far no one is in sight to assume this task 
from the customs side and act as a counterpart and IBM partner to FRONTEX.  
Several options should be considered, as discussed below. 
4.3.1  Creation of a European Customs Agency as a direct counterpart to 
FRONTEX 
Such an agency had been considered before and was recently suggested again by MEP 
Sebastian Valentin Bodu  (EPP/RO),
141 with reference to significant divergences in customs 
competences and thus the risk of a non-uniform application of EU legislation. Although 
acknowledged by the Commission with a sceptical reaction,
142 the proposal remains relevant: 
even if there was a high compliance rate, the provisions of the new customs code (MCC) 
underline the sensitive character of the uniformity issue for the future of the Customs Union. In 
addition, in contrast to the 2003 to 2007 period during which the Commission looked at the 
question, there are now a far greater number of customs issues to be coordinated, thanks to the 
Lisbon Treaty and the transfer of competences from the former third pillar. 
The creation of an entirely new agency would be difficult financially, given the spending cuts 
scheduled by the Financial Framework 2014–20. One alternative might be a smaller body 
similar to the planned European Agency for large-scale IT systems.
143 One could also argue that 
greater reliability in revenue collection would imply budgetary benefits for the Union. Possibly 
such factors may prompt the Commission to reconsider the issue – as indicated by 
Commissioner Algirdas Šemeta
144 – when conducting the forthcoming revision of the Customs 
2013 Programme. 
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European Commission (2010c). 
143 See the amended Commission proposal of 19 March 2010 (COM(2010) 93 final), which estimates an 
operational expenditure of €106.7 million for the creation of the agency. 
144 See European Commission (2010c). CUSTOMS COOPERATION IN THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE | 27 
 
4.3.2 Attribution  of  functions to the Customs Cooperation Working Party 
There is some support for keeping this familiar body alive, especially within the member states 
and perhaps adding to it those competences necessary to exercise a coordinating role, not only 
in security but also regulatory matters.
145 The General Secretariat of the Council, however, 
views this dubiously, as the staff and other infrastructure necessary to carry out the extensive 
tasks would hardly be available there. The rotating presidency of the Customs Cooperation 
Working Party (CCWP) is also seen as a highly counterproductive element.
146 
Further difficulties lie in the explicit third pillar past of the group.
147 The retrospective 
orientation of the CCWP is confirmed by its
148 strategy document “Revised strategy for customs 
cooperation in the third pillar”
149 adopted on 4 November 2009 and approved shortly afterwards 
by the Article 36 Committee, still in application today. The document does not contain any 
references to the Lisbon Treaty and the changes it would introduce.  
Under these circumstances, the CCWP would not appear an appropriate choice for the complex 
coordination matters at stake within the EU Customs Union. 
4.3.3  Creation of a ‘Customs Department’ within FRONTEX 
There are certainly a number of positive arguments in favour of adding a strong customs 
element to FRONTEX. The clear dynamism of the new agency, which has repeatedly adapted to 
swift changes, is quite likely to enable it to digest such an additional challenge as well. Many of 
its officers, including the director, can build on personal experience in cooperating with customs 
at the national level. Finally, the addition of a customs component could be seen as a token of a 
strengthened regulatory element of FRONTEX, liberating it from its current reputation as a 
mere law enforcement body. This could be very helpful especially in view of the envisaged 
European border guard system, with its intended image as a neutral border management tool. 
The present police reputation of FRONTEX nonetheless represents a significant obstacle to its 
further enhancement as a joint police–customs institution: the integration into a perceived police 
or quasi-police authority would in some ways conflict with the self-image of customs services 
and be difficult to defend to administrations as well as individual officials. We should also see 
the disadvantages of such a police-customs mix within a “border super-agency” as had been 
stated at the national level by the “Werthebach-Kommission” in Germany
150 and some concerns 
expressed in the UK regarding its new UK Border Agency.
151  
4.3.4 Europol 
Occasionally, Europol is mentioned as a possible option. Even if an expansion towards new 
horizons were compatible with its mandate, it would not appear a fortunate choice for practical 
or political reasons. Above all, with its mission as a “law enforcement agency of the EU”,
152 
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Europol would have very little if anything in common with the goods-related, border 
management approach by customs. 
4.3.5  Joining forces with the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) 
As a last (but not least) option it is worthwhile considering OLAF. Although a Commission 
service, it enjoys a special independent status. With its origins stemming mainly from the 
former DG XXI (the predecessor of DG TAXUD) in 1995,
153 OLAF is most familiar with 
customs procedures and legislation. Even when looking at border matters from the 
(administrative) fraud-combating viewpoint, the cooperation with national authorities and 
investigators primarily from the customs field belongs to the day-to-day business of the 
European Anti-Fraud Office. 
It appears that the addition of a border management department overseeing regulatory and 
security issues could fit quite well into the existing architecture and would even provide for a 
number of interesting points of contact. From the angle of corporate identity and administrative 
culture, the merger of OLAF with another border-related and customs-based service would 
represent a perfect fit. Of course, an appropriate name change would be an absolute must to 
reflect the new range of assignments. In comparison to the FRONTEX option, the OLAF 
solution would avoid the “super-agency” architecture with all its disadvantages, while retaining 
a system of checks and balances which could allow customs with its lighter, facilitation-minded 
approach to make its mark on day-to-day border management. The danger of a ‘return’ of 3
rd 
Pillar working methods, possibly “contaminating other (formerly considered) first pillar 
areas”
154 could also be countered more efficiently by this approach. 
Again a delicate issue would be that of budget: just like other Commission services OLAF is 
committed to reducing staff and would not be able to absorb the new functions with the current 
resources.
155 Nevertheless, this would not distinguish OLAF from the other options considered; 
the provision of sufficient resources would be a requirement for all solutions. And the upgrading 
of an existing body would in any case be less expensive than the creation of a new agency. 
In conclusion, the most promising visions appear to be those for which the customs border 
management functions do not require a stand-alone organisation (an argument against the 
European Customs Agency (ECA) option of section 5.3.1); for which a future-oriented, Lisbon-
compatible environment could be found (an argument against the CCWP option of 5.3.2); and 
which are consistent with the requirements of a customs corporate identity (an argument against 
the Europol and possibly FRONTEX options of 5.3.4 and 5.3.3). In positive terms, if there are 
not sufficient funds available to finance an ECA (5.3.1), the next best option would be that of 
joining OLAF (5.3.5). 
5.  Conclusions and policy recommendations 
This study has undertaken to show that any efficient border management, be it for security or 
regulatory purposes, has to be based on a coherent embedding of the customs administrations. 
Over the years, from biblical times to the Single Market, customs services have demonstrated 
that their goods-related expertise as gleaned from an intimate knowledge of trade, transport and 
fiscal practices have represented an invaluable asset to governments in planning and enforcing 
policies, from revenue collection and prohibition to fully-fledged security strategies.  
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Despite the evident need for a dual scheme in border matters (border guards in relation to 
persons, customs in relation to goods), we periodically encounter attempts to disturb the 
precious balance – because of short-lived publicity campaigns by eager politicians (as occurred 
during the recent Yemen affair) or a general drifting apart of security from mainstream policies 
(as in the first–third pillar schism during the post-Maastricht era after 1992). Without being 
noticed by either the wider public or even the political world, the EU seems to have withdrawn 
from a worldwide consensus that the management of borders for security or facilitation should 
always be a joint matter for customs and border guards.  
While internationally our main trade and security partners continue to perfect their cooperative 
systems, we seem to be taking another route, confining the principally open-ended concept of 
integrated border management solely to cooperation between police and border guard forces. 
Customs is left out in the cold – especially at the European level, and the position of an efficient 
customs coordinator remains vacant. 
This exclusion from coordination functions appears all the less comprehensible as customs 
possesses all the credentials to prove its ability to react to security challenges and thus deliver a 
significant contribution to the fight against terrorism. This was evidenced by its involvement in 
the US-led Container Security Initiative, various WCO programmes and finally the EU’s own 
project, the security amendment to the Customs Code of 2005. 
It is high time to recover lost ground and catch up with the world standard. The ongoing 
discussion on the future of FRONTEX is an excellent occasion on which to draw public 
attention to the role of customs, all the more so as the FRONTEX management is well aware 
that it needs a strong partner on the customs side to succeed in its mission. 
Attributing the right place to customs at the European level implies consideration of two main 
aspects. First is the identification of the vital characteristics of a customs-specific coordination 
platform, taking into account the intrinsic tensions between control and facilitation needs on the 
one side and security and regulatory concepts on the other. The second aspect concerns the 
choice of an appropriate format: will customs need to be an exact mirror of FRONTEX or could 
a simpler version do it as well, possibly by joining an existing body? 
Regarding the first aspect and the most important requirements for efficient customs 
coordination, this study finds that a modern, Lisbon-oriented environment is needed, which is 
open to both security and regulatory concerns and is also in line with the customs corporate 
spirit, i.e. in a possible partnership customs should not appear to be a junior partner to an 
outspoken police organisation. In terms of the format – if a stand-alone ECA cannot be justified 
– customs should go into partnership with OLAF, which is the first choice anyway because of 
its roots and close links to the customs world.  
Policy recommendations 
1.  Policy-makers should keep a watchful eye on the developments surrounding the concept 
of integrated border management (IBM) in the EU. The approach currently applied dates 
from pre-Lisbon times, i.e. it is still inspired by intergovernmental working methods 
under the former Title VI TEU, without due control exercised by the EP and the 
European Court of Justice. Since the approach focuses unilaterally on the control of 
persons carried out by police authorities – while neglecting freight-related security to be 
ensured by customs, it is neither compatible with international standards, nor (in the 
absence of the due involvement of the customs authorities) does it provide for satisfactory 
protection and management of the external border. 30 | PETER HOBBING 
 
2.  The European Commission and the Council should do the necessary to revise the current 
IBM concept as defined by the Council in December 2006 and thus ensure the full 
involvement of customs. Recent events such as the Yemen air freight bomb plot of 
October 2010 and the ‘dirty bomb’ fears in the Italian port of Genoa of February 2011 
clearly underline that European security is threatened not only by the entry of terrorists 
but also that of unaccompanied terrorist devices hidden in freight consignments. In 
addition, the more citizen/business-oriented border approach applied by customs 
(selective and risk-based controls rather than 100% routine checks) could inspire 
‘smarter’ concepts in border security. 
3.  The current FRONTEX evaluation, as well as the ongoing amendment procedure for the 
FRONTEX Regulation 2007/2004, would represent an excellent opportunity to support 
FRONTEX in its express wish to find a competent partner on the customs side. The 
organisation in question should be able to represent customs in the full range of its 
competences, i.e. regulatory as well as security aspects. The CCWP within the Council 
security structure would thus not be an appropriate choice. 
4.  The counterpart to FRONTEX on the customs side could be designed either as a stand-
alone European agency (European Customs Agency) or if this were not feasible for 
budgetary reasons, as a joint venture with the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). The 
strong presence of EU-oriented customs in the IBM architecture would also serve to 
further enhance the European Border Guard System in the spirit of a clear European 
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